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The First World War ended with the capitulation of Gennany. It was by no means a simple 
defeat for the country, because the hardship four and a half years of warfare was unprecedented 
in the history. It was a total war accompanied by tremendous sacrifice on both sides. 
Establishment of Soviet Russia in the previous year strongly influenced Germans, and on 
October 29, 1918, the revolt of Marine Corps at Kiel Naval Base propagated itself like a wild 
fire to all over the country. The revolution led to a general strike in Berlin on November 9, and 
then on the following day to the "Arbeiter und-Soldatenrate" (the Council of Workers and 
Soldiers) which constituted the Revolutionary Goveonment. 
The revolution, accompanied with fierce civil war in surrection, was avorted by the adoption 
of "capital-labor entente" of Social Democratic Party which was based on the so-called 
"zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft" of November 15 concluded between K. Regin; Chainnan of Freie 
Gewerkschaften (affiliated with Social Democratic Party) and the leaders of Gergan monopoly 
capital, W. Ratenau, C. F. v. Siemens, F. Stinness and others. In August, 1919, the "Weimar 
Structure" was born. In the meantime, the "hyperinflation" started in 1921 reached the peak 
two years later, and finally in 1924, the intervention of the United States in the reparation issue 
~"the Dawes Plan" triggered a large inflow of credit from America. Mark became stable again, 
and it paved the way for resurrection of Gennan capitalism. 
We must not, however, overlook the fact that behind the economic crisis resulting from the 
capitulation of Germany and ensuing political confusion, there was an even more fundamental 
crisis surrounding Gennan capitalis on itself. The crisis had many different aspects and it is not 
esay to reduce them into a simple description, but the author considers that it can be summarized 
in three key points. 
First point: if we direct our attention to constitution of leaders of the Gennan revolution 
(Rate movent), we notice that the nucleus consisted of so-called "Revotionare Obleunte"-group 
of intra--company activists, and in particular those skilled workers who were members of 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University. 
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Deutsche Metalarbeiter Verband (German Metalworkers Union).') As will be explained later, 
they are characterized by a certain managerial role in the diverse process of machining and 
assembly work. The fact that these privileged workers formed the nucleus of Rate signifies that 
the "dictatorial leadership to labor",2) as the fundamental norm of capitalism in production 
process, started to lose the ground within one of the bases of German capitalism. This intrinsic 
crisis did not disappear even after the danger of outright revolution had been overcome. The 
advent of Weimar structure added further constraints to the capitalists such as recognition of 
labor union's "equal status" and eight hours' labor pere day. In these circumstances, was the 
capital able to reassert the "dictatorial leadership on labor", and if so, by what ways and means? 
Thus is the first point. 
Second Point: the defeat, loss of all colonies under the Verssailles Treaty, session of Alsas 
Lorraine and a part of Schlesian and huge reparation payments-all of these had an effect to 
weaken Gennan capitalism. Inflation temporarily benefited export, but it also caused delay in 
replacement of obsolete capital equipment. Thus, as soon as the mark became stable as a result 
of the Douse plan and German capitalism was reintegrated into the normal structure of 
international market, Gennan industry came to be exposed to overwhelming competitive strength 
of American industry which had gained strength before, during and after the First World War. 
Inferiority of Gennan industry was such that certain sectors seemed to have little chance of 
survival. In this context, the lack of competing strength in the international market becomes the 
second point of criteria. 
Third Point: It relates to the crisis of imperialistic existence of German capitalism resulting 
1) Tsubogou Minoru: "Keiei Rate Undono Kiso-Daiichiji Sekai Taisento Taishunai Katsudokasono 
Keisei (The Bases of Management Rate Movement-The First World War and Formation of 
Activists among the People)" (1)--(4) in "Hogaku Zasshi", Osaka Municipal University, Vol. 24, 
No.1, 2, 4 and Vol. 25, No.1. Also, see p, v. Oertzen, "Betriebsrate in der November Revolution", 
Dusseldorf, 1963, p. 371. 
2 ) "In the production process, the capital assumed the right of command over the labor, that is to say, on 
the acting workforce or on workers themselves", "The capitalistic command is characterized by a dual 
structure, because on one hand, the production process under its command is in itself a social 
process of work to produce goods, while on the other hand it is also a process in which the capital 
multiplies its vaJue. The command takes a despotic form", K. Marx, "The Capital", Hoyaku 
Zenshu, Vol. 1, Ia p. 407 and 435 (the author's underline). 
As to the "despotic command over the labor" exerted by the capital according to Marx, this 
concept is used as a key to analysis of capitalism by Ozaki, Shuji in his "Shihonshugi kara 
Shakaishugi e-"Hiteino Hitei Mandai ni Yosete" (From Capitalism to Socialism) -a study of 
the "Negation of Negation" Issue, and "Shoyu Henkakuto Kaikyu to shiteno Rodoha - Shihonshugi 
kara Shakaishugi e (Part II) (Transformation of Ownership and "Workers as a class"- From 
Capitalism to Socialism) in Keizai, 1975-6, and 1978-5, A study of the history of political econmy 
based on the same concept was undertaken by Shimizu, Katsuhiro in "Sangyo Kakumeiki France oi 
okeru Rodosha Hinkoo Mandai" (Impoverishment of Workers in France during the Industrial 
Revolution) in Keizai Ronso, 127-2· 3 and also by Koda, Ryoichi, in "Doitsu Kikai Kogyo to 
Lowesha Shin Kojo" (German Machinery Industry and Lowe's New Plant), in Keizai Ronso, 129-
6. 
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in particular from disbanding and loss of the country's military forces. In the course of capitula-
tion to revolution, the German armed forces completely lost its commanding system. The 
collapse was further aggravated by the ban on armament imposed under the Versailles Treaty. 
The occupation of Ruler District by France and Belgium of 1923 and the ensuing economic 
confusion disclosed that the base of German imperialistic capitalism became extremely fragile. 
Would the German capitalism eventually be able to restore its imperialistic autonomy in 
competition with other imperialistic powers? This issue is the third point. 
The real crisis to be understood in the light of these three issues. Whether or not and how 
the crisis was to be overceme? The chance of survival of German capitalism following 
stabilization of mark in 1924 largely depended on this basic issue. 
At the risk of oversimplification, perhaps we might make the following statement: an 
approach to resolve the three crises of German capitalism already referred to first emmerged 
under the Weimar Structure as the industrial rationalization movement-so--called "der 
Rationalisierrungsbemegung". This movement, however, not only failed to tum out successful 
consequences, but served to aggtavate contradictions, and another crisis was to emerge in new 
forms. Finally, and in the global recession, a sort of "answer" appeared under the Nazi Regime. 
If we adopt such a point of view to understand the German capitalism between the two 
World Wars, it would be very appropriate for us to focus our attention to the history of growth 
of German automobile industry during this period, because it showed a unique pattern of 
development in this period. 
Figure I shows automobile output in Germany from the tum of the century until 1938. 
German automobile production in this period contains two distinct phases of development. The 
first phase corresponds to the "industrial rationalization movement" from 1924 to 1928. The 
industry achieved a rapid growth of unforeseen character during this period, completely different 
from the prewar pattern. In the same period, gross national output and those of major industrial 
sectors in Germany proceeded as follows (base year 100=1913) : gross output was 71.9 in 1924 
and increased to 102.1 in 1929, while output of coal and steel grew from 62.5 to 86.0 in the 
same period. From 1925 to 1929, electrical equipment and chemical products grew from 146 to 
238 and 133 to 186.1, respectively.3) In comparison, growth of automobile output was dispro-
portionately high - from 120 in 1924 to 738.5 in 1928, although we also notice that the growth 
peaked out in 1928 and started to decline even before the worldwide panic of October, 1929 and 
decline of other industry in Germany (index of auto production in 1929 was 686.0). The share 
of automobile industry in the total industry of Germany, however, was far from 
3) Kurihara Masaru: "Nazism Taiseino Seiritsu" (The Establishment of Nazi Regime), 1981, p. 263, 
Table 28. 
The data on automobiles were those extracted from statistics classified as "Automobiles and 
Marine Vessels": W. G. Hoffman, "Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der mitte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts", BerliniHeideiberglNew York, 1965, p.342f. For total output and electrical 
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Fig. 1 German Automobil Output 1901-1938. 
important.4) In 1927, "land transportation vehicle" including automobiles was no more than 2% 
of total industrial output, way below that of coaVsteel (15,6%), chemical products (15.0%), 
electrical equipment (4.8%) and textiles (14.8%). 
The second phase covers six years from 1933 to 1938 (Figure 1). We can see that from the 
very moment of establishment of Nazi Regime, the automobile industry started to grow at a rate 
far ahead of the growth during the first phase, with a result that the importance of automobile 
industry in the framework of German capitalism became totally different. Table 1 a shows 
transition of output by major industry of Germany from 1933 to 1938, and Table 1b indicates 
movement of export by these industrial sectors in the same period. These tales demonstrate that 
by the end of 30's, German automobile industry achieved a scale comparable to those traditional 
key sectors like coal/steel, electrical machinery and chemicals both in output and in volume of 
export. 
In the course of development in these two phases, the German automobile industry was able 
to grow but of almost negligible status to one of the major factors of German industry. Of even 
greater importance, the Nazi Regime undertook positive measures at the start of the second 
phase to promote automobile-related industry, of which construction of Autobahn was a typical 
4) Kata Eiichi: "Weimar Taiseino Keizai Kozo" (The Economic Structure of Weimar Republic), 
1973, p. 191, Table 34, which was based on the "Statistisches Jahrbuch fUr das Deutsche Rbich", 
1929, p. 344-345. 
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Tab 1 a German Main Industries Output 1933-1938 (million RM) 
Industry 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Coal 1,169 1,304 1,512 1,697 2,047 2,173 
Iron 282 463 665 883 891 1,093 
Steel 562 826 1,138 1,405 1,553 1,935 
Automobil 383 700 1,148 1,414 1,636 2,017 
Synthetic fiber 141 210 248 275 437 557 
Cotton 303 - 409 446 494 525 
b German Main Industries Export 1934-1938 Cmmion RM) 
Industry 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Coal 224.5 261.4 277.5 440.4 379.5 
Cotton 39.2 41.7 52.1 86.1 92.0 
Chemistry 169.0 172.0 177.9 195.3 169.4 
Machin tool 87.0 78.2 148.2 209.1 206.9 
Electrical Equipment 218.6 226.0 258.3 312.3 335.4 
Precision Instrument 62.3 72.4 90.5 116.5 120.0 
Automobil 94.5 120.0 171.2 269.7 259.4 
Statistisches Jahrbuch fUr das Deutsche Reich, 1935-1940. 
R. J. Overy, Cars, Roads, And Economic Recovery in Germany 1932-8, The Economic History 
Review 2nd Ser. 28-3, 1975, P. 479. 
example. 
What was the significance of the phenomenal growth of automobile industry to the overall 
German capitalism between the two world wars? Above all, what role did it play in conjunction 
with solution of the three crises inherent in German capitalism after the First World War? This 
paper attempts to find the answers to these questions. 
In looking over history of economic research, and particularly those previous discussions 
among Japanese researchers on the subject of German capitalism between the two World Wars,5) 
5) Some examples of research made in Japan regarding German capitalism between the two world wars 
are: Tsukamoto Ken, "Nazis Keizai" (Nazi Economy), 1964, Kato Eiichi. "Weimar Taiseino 
Keizai Kozo" (1973, ibid. (4), Institute of Social Science. Tokyo University. "Nazis Taiseito New 
Deal" (Nazi Regime and New Deal), 1975, Kurihara Yu, "Nazism Taiseino Seiritsu, 1981, ibid. 3, 
and Ono Eiji, "Gendal Doitsu Shakaishi Kenkyu Josetsu" (Introduction to the Social History of 
Modem Germany) 1982. In addition, the following papers should be of interest: Institute of Social 
Science, ibid., containing "Nazism Taiseikano Tekko Shihon" (Steel Industry Capital under the Nazi 
Government) by Kudo Akira, "Nazism no Rodo Seisaku" (Nazi Labor Policy) by Tobara Shiro, 
and "Nazis Zaisei" (The Finance of Nazi Goverment), Kato Eiichi, Ref. also Kudo Akira, "IG 
Farben no Seiritsuto Tenkai" (Founding and Development of IG Farben), (1), (2), in "Shakai 
Kagaku Kenkyu", Vol. 29. No.5 and 6. 
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we notice that primary attention was given to those traditional industrial sectors dating back to 
the Second Empire such as coal/steel, electrical machinery and chemicals. Some references to 
automobile industry do exist, but due to its negligible status during Weimar period, it was largely 
excluded from the scope of detailed study,6) and in the author's opinion,7) this does not seem 
reasonable, because the absence of interest has acted as a major constraint to discussion on 
Gennan capitalism during this period. 
What is important is not absolute or relative norms applicable to German automobile 
industry from time to time. The real importance concerns the fact that the status of the industry 
within the total framework of German capitalism underwent a radical and qualitative change 
during the period. By concentrating our attention to this phenomenon and from such a point of 
view during the years from the "rationalization movement" of Weimar period to the advent of 
Nazi Regime, it might be possible for us to gain a new Insight into the transition of overall 
Gennan capitalism during the period between the two World Wars, and above all, to the 
establishment and development of the Nazi Regime itself. 
6) References to German Automobile industry can be seen in Tsukamoto (ibid. p. 246, 296, 313, 314), 
Kato (ibid., p.210, 211), Kudo (ibid. "Tekko" p.108), Tohara (ibid., p.161) and Kurihara 
(ibid., p. 261), although they are by no means exhaustive in extent. 
As an early example of research on German automobile industry between the two World Wars, 
see Furukawa, Sumiaki, "Volkswagenwerk no Seiritsu Katei" (Process of Establishment of 
Volkswagenwerk) (0, (2) in "Rokko-dai Ronshu", 1978, and "Volkswagenwerk no Seisei no 
Shiteki Zenkeieno Sekkin" (An Approach to the Historical Study of Growth of Volkswagenwerk), 
(0, "Doitsu Jidosha Kogyono Hattenno Sbuyo Tokucho (Main Characteristics of Development of 
German Autombile Industry), in "Kagoshima Keizai Ronshu, 1982. Although these studies are 
confined to the history of Volkswagen, they provide accounts of general characteristics of the 
growth made by German Automobile industry at large. The author, however, holds different views 
on several factual issues discussed in these papers as mentioned later. Nakamura Seiji, "Gendai 
lidosha Kogyoron" (Modem Automobile Industry, 1983, p. 121-124 and Abo, Tetsuo, "Sengoki 
Americano Taigai Toshi (Overseas Investment by the Pastwar U. S. A.) 1984, p. 229, pp.235-238, 
also contain some broad references based on these authors' standpoints. 
7) Discussions and theories offered by Japanese researchers on the German capitalism between the two 
World Wars and in particular those no Nazism may be classified into three thpes: (1) those which 
are based on "type" concept, i. e., to understand German capitalism as a special type of capitalism 
and explaining Nazism as the product of "underdeveloped" and "archaic" characters of capitalism in 
Germany, (2) theories based on the national monopolistic capitalism, and (3) theories based on 
"intermediate class" concept. The author plans to develop his research in this area some time in 
future. 
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I "Industrial Rationalization Movement" and Transformation of Production-
process in the German Automobile Industry 
G. Schlesinger,S) Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the Berlin Technical University, 
often called "the Father of Industrial Rationalization Movement9)", made an important comment 
in 1925. He said; "the opening of German frontier may mean the death of our automobile and 
automobile-related industry, and if that happens, we will never see them again". 
The statement contained in a pamphletlO) titled "Der Daseinskampf der Deutschen 
Automobilindustrie" (The Struggle for survival of German Automobile Industry) presents a 
circumstance clearly portrayed in the figures of automobile import/export in Germany when the 
mark became stable (Figure 2). We can see that export tumbled while import event up sharply. 
This happened because competitive strength of automobile industry in Gennany fell far behind of 
others, especially that of the United States. Table 2 shows price comparison prepared by 
Reichsverhand der Automobilindustrie (German Automobile Industry Association) in 1925 as a 
data in support of its demand for protective tariff on Gennan and U. S. cars of comparable 
classes. For every class of cars, duty free cost of U. S. made car is less than a half of Gennan 
car. A Ford car cost only 40% of Brennabor which belonged to the equivalent class. This 
surprising productivity gap between the Gennan and U. S. automobile industry is even more 
clear if we compare number of workers needed to producer a car. lI) In Germany, one Arger 
Took 120 workers, a Horch 350, and a Benz 450. Against this. in the United States. a Ford took 
no more than 5-3/4 workers to be completed. 
These data are sufficient to convince us that the tremendous productivity gap between the 
U. S. and German automobile industries arose not from quantitative (scale) factors but from 
fundamental qualitative difference in the structure of production (technical process and 
organization of workforce). 
In response to the desperate plea of Reichsverband der Automobilindustrie, "ErziehungszoU" 
(a protective duty characterized by degressive tariff) was introduced, and this allowed the 
German automobile industry to improve rationalization of production. We are going to see. 
8) For the Industrial rationlization movement in Germany, see Yoshida Kazuo, "Doitsu Gorika Undo 
Ron" (Rationalization in Germany), 1976, Tsukamoto and Kato, ibid. Examples of study 
published before the Second World War are Arisawa Hiromi and Abe Isamu, "Sekai Kyokoto 
Kokusai Seijino kiki" (Worldwide Recession and Crisis of International Politics), 1931 and Seiichi 
Kojima, "Sangyo Gorika" (Industrial Rationalization), 1930. However, as stated by Abe, (ibid., p. 
170), there is no consensus among these authors regarding the results and Hmitation of the 
movement. 
9) Koda, ibid., and "Doitsu IGkai Kogyoshi • Gorikaundoshi to G. Schlessinger no 'Keiei Kagaku' 
(History of German Industry and Rationalization Movement, and the 'management Science' of G. 
Schlessinger, Saga Daigaku Keizai Ronshu. 16-3, 1983. 
10) Berlin, 1925, Zitiert bei F. Ledennann Fehlrationalisienm~der Irrweg der deutschen AutomobiIin-
dustrie seit der Stabilisierung der Mark, Betribswirtscha/tliche Studie eines Bcispieis der Investion-
skonjunktur, Stuttgart, 1933, S. 15. 
11) E. Honermeier, Die Ford Motor Company, 1926, Leipzig, S. 127. 
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Fig. 2 German Automobil Import and Export 1922-1926. 
Tab.2 Prices of American Car and German Car 1925 
American Cars Its weight Its Price without German car of Its price tariff comparable class 
(Kg) (RM) (RM) 
Ford 720 2,430 Brennabor 6,050 
Chivolet 810 2,849 Dixi 8,075 
Buick 1,565 6,452 Protos 13,500 
Cadellack 1,980 16,650 Audi 18/70 30,500 
Almut Addicks, Die deutsche KraJtJahrzeugindustrie in Nachkriegszeit (Seil 1924), Diss. 
Munchen 1933, S. 26. 
under these circumstances, how the industry carried out its struggle for survival-uder 
Daseinskampf' . 
2. From "Reihenfertigung" to "F1iessferfigung" 
At the time when German automobile industry faced the overwhelming superiority of the U. 
S. competitors, the industry was based on a production system which was called "Reihen-
fertigung", consisting of a lot of 100 to 500 cars. 
"First, size of a production lot is determined, materials needed for the lot are ordered, 
and production starts when the materials ordered have been delivered. Nonnally, one 
production cycle (series) takes a quarter of year, which means that in total, three 
GERMAN CAPITALISM AND THE POSITION OF AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 23 
BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS (J) 
quarters of a year go from ordering of materials to delivery, stoc~ng. repetition of 
machining and intermediary stocking to final assembly. All capital is thus locked up in 
the cycle, and a new series starts only when all investment has been recovered. 12)" 
In order to improve the out dated production system which was clearly uncompetitive, 
German automobile industrialists and engineers started massive pilgrimage (Pilgerfahrt) 13) to 
the United States. Their holy land was Highland Park in Detroit. 04) 
Adam Opel in Riisselsheim-am-Main was the first to introduce "Fliessband" (belt convey-
or) in 1923. Following this, belt conveyor systems were installed successively by Brennabor-
Werke (Brandenburg) in 1924, by Adler-Werke (Frankfurt AIM) and BMW Bayerische 
Motorenwerkerke (Munich) in 1926, and by Daimler-Benz (Stuttgart) in 1927 according to 
company records. IS), 16) A survey!') conducted by the German Federation of Metalworkers 
(DMV) , who was to be the party m,?st affected by the productive innovation, tells us that in 
1928, of total 29 plants surveyed by the Federation, 18 (or 62% employing 3D, 902 workers or 
67.9% of total) had experienced complete renovation of production facilities. Four (or 13.8%, 
with 12,119 or 26.7% of workers) reported implementation of partial renovation, while seven 
(24.4% with 2,467 workers of 5.4% of total workforce) remained unchanged. This shows that 
by 1928, the majority of automobile manufacturers in Gennany realized "certain" innovation of 
production. This being the case, we must see how it changed the automobile plants in Gennany. 
A paper1B) written by Guido Prachtl, an engineer working for Adler-Werke, with regard to 
the innovation introduced in his own factory, provides us with some insight on the matter. 19) 
Figures 3A illustrates the Reibenfertigung-based work organization prior to innovation, while 3B 
shows that of Fliessfertigung. 
In the parts machining process of Reihenfertigung (Fig. 3A, lower right side), shops 
12) P. Friedman, a. a. O. S. 6l. 
13) A. Becker, Absatzproblem der deutschen PKW-Industrie 1925-1932, Diss. Regensburg, 1979, S. 68ff. 
P. Riebensam, Der Zug nach USA. Gedanken nach einer Amen·ka-Reise. Berlin 1924. 
14) Regarding "Ford System", see Morl Shigetaka, "Keiei Kanri Soron" (Management), 2nd (Revised) 
edition, 1965, and Shiomi Haruhito, "Gendai Tairyo Seisan Taiseiron" (Modern Mass Production), 
1978. 
15) Daimler=Benz AG, 75 Jahre Motorisierung des Verkehrs, Stuttgart-Untertiirkheim, 1961, S. 225. H. 
Maurer, Das Zusammenschlupproblem in der deutschen Automobilindustrie mit besonderer 
Beriicksichtigung der Auto-Union AG, Diss. Zurich, 1936. 
16) G. Schlessinger wrote in the "Werksstattstechnik" a periodical under his editorship, on this process 
-see Zeitgemissebetriebsorganisation in einer deutschen Automobilfabrik, XXJg. 15, 10, 1926, Heft 
20. This account is followed by pictorial reports from each automobile plant. 
17) Der deutsche Metalarbeiterverband, Die deutsche Automobilindustrie An!ang 1928. zitiert bei F. 
Lederman, a. a. O. S. 27. 
18) G. Prachtl, Von der Reihenfertigung zur Flieftarbeit insbesondere mi deutschen Automobilbau. Diss. 
Technischen Hochschule Darmstadt. 1926. 
19) F. Schumann, Die Arbeiter der Daimler = Motoren = Gesellschaft Stuttgart = Untertiirkheim, 
"Schriften des Vereins fiir Sozialpolitik", 135 Band L, Leipzig, 1911, was used as reference to 
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B Working Organization of "FlieBfertigung" 
Fig. 3 
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are divided into specific types of machine tools (lathes, boring machines, milling machlnes,_ etc.) 
with specialized operators for each type of machines. Generally speaking. each shop has the 
head (Meister), skilled workers (Professionist), semi-skilled workers (Angelemte), unskilled 
workers (Ungelernte) and apprentices (Lehrlinge). The company subcontracts (Akkord) with 
the Meister or Professionist who then leads semi-skilled and lower levels of workers to complete 
the job, often by organizing people into "Kolonen", each comprising several workers. The 
Meister and Professionist are solely responsible for production. management including work 
planning and methods. They were skilled enough to organize work around the machines in their 
charge, and for this reason, they were highly independent in command of both mental and 
physical aspects of the work. Training of skills of workers was also their responsibility. Thus, 
since each shop is functionally independent, materials to be processed must be moved by movers 
back and forth among these shops. Assembling of a car required a number of fine adjustments 
by "Kolonen" of workers led by a skilled worker (Professionist). As such. in the Reihenfer-
tigung type of organization, the entire work process is entrusted in the hands of the Meister and 
Professionist as individuals. 20) 
On the other hand. novelty of the Fliessfertigung is blatantly clear (Fig. 3B). Those 
functional shops of specific types of machine tools now disappear, and instead, we see 
streamlined flows of production for each types of parts and components. These flows then go on 
to streamlined assembly lines of engines, gear boxes and other units, and then to the final 
complete assembly lines. From the point of entry of raw materials to the departure of completed 
vehicles, the work flows like a stream. Machining and assembling are now a part of the 
downstream, in which Fliessband (belt conveyors) acts as the dominant factor of forced pro-
gression (Fliess means stream). 
As the result of the drastic change of production process, function of individual workers and 
"social organization of labor" undergo a complete transition. Each worker, now posted along 
continuous stream of production line, repeats a same, and highly fragmented, work over and 
over again. Conventional skills are no longer required. The "mental factors of work process" 
are now completely detached from workers and become "objectified" in mechanical systems. 
Management of the entire plant operations is now concentrated to "Werkbiiro" (Production 
Control Room), shown in the middle of Figure 3B together with its functional breakdown, 
where engineers and managers supervise the plant. 
This "remodelling of production process" by the application of "American Model,,21) elimi-
nated completely the relative independence of workers under the Reihenfertigung organization 
based on individual skill. The capital now acquired a direct, material and objective means to 
20) So called "organized sabotage" which occurred often at metallurgy· related plants in major 
capitalistic comity from the end of 190 to the beginning of this century was partly due to this factor. 
In the postwar Germany, it became the basis for workers Rate movement as explained already. 
21) The term "U. S. Model" (American System) is used here not in its narrow reuse of so-called 
"American system of manufacturing" which started to be used following the World Industrial 
Exposition of London in 1851. Rather, it means the "U. S. production system in the 20th century" 
as it is seen in the advent of Ford system in the first decade of this century. 
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Tab. 3 German Automobil Output and its workers index 1925= 100, ]925-1928 
year [92; [926 1927 [928 
workers [00 64.0 91.4 101.0 
output [00 91.9 232.4 279.2 
Hennann Maurer, Das Zusammenschlu.pproblem in der deutschen Auto-
mobilindustrie. 1936, S. 14. 
establish a "dictatorial hegemony" over workers. 
In this process, workers skilled in machining and assembly-the group of people which 
produced a number of revolutionary leaders (so-called "Obleute") at the time of Arbeiter-und-
Soldateurate--- were completely dispelled from direct lines of production insofar as the German 
automobile industry was concerned.22) Table 3 illustrates transition of the industry's output from 
1928 in relation to fluctuation of number of workers employed. It clearly tells us that the 
German automobile industry in this process expelled a large number of workers out of 
production lines (see 1926) while expanding rapidly its capacity. This occurred along with 
formation of an element of the "new intermediary class", or those employees having technical 
educational background who are distinctly different from line workers. 
II Management Crisis of German Automobile Companies and Factors of the Crisis 
1. Management Crisis 
We have seen that the German automobile industry achieved a radical transition of 
production process under the "industrial rationalization movement". A further look into the 
industry, however, brings us a surprise. In spite of the tremendous production capacity, the 
industry was affected with a serious management difficulty. 
Table 4a shows the transition of dividend rates declared by the major automobile 
manufacturers in Germany from 1913 (before the start of the First World War) to the period 
of "industrial rationalization movement".23) In the year 1913 immediately preceding the war, 14 
out of 18 companies were paying dividends, and of these 14, 9 maintained the dividend rate to 
12% or more. During the rationalization period, the situation changes radically. From 1923 to 
1924, only 9 or one third of 27 companies were able to declare dividend payment. The number 
of companies paring dividends decrease from year to year thereafter -6 in 1925/26, 9 in 1927/28, 
22) In conSidering those approaches taken under the "industrial rationalization movement" (ref. 
Yoshida, ibid., p. 94) as well as their overall characteristics, we may presume that the same process 
took place in other. sectors of industry as well. For the purpose of the present study, we need not 
consider this aspect. 
23) F. Ledermann, a. a. 0., S. 13. Adam Opel and Brennavor are not included because they were 
private (family) companies at that time. 
Tab. 4 a Dividend rates of major Gennan Automobil firms (%) b Their net losses (RM) 
~' 1913 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 fi= \14 \24 \25 \26 \27 \28 \29 \30 1913 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 \14 \25 \26 \27 \28 \29 \30 
NAG 0 12 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,408,494 14,022,952 0 
Presto 0 12 12 8 6 - - - 0 0 0 0 
Dux - 0 0 0 - - - - 12,693 0 
Bussing - 8 5 6 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 608,075 
M-Mulag 15 0 6 0 0 - - - 0 9,174,392 0 226,944 
Dfirkopp 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 306,752 495,687 3,221,071 
Hanomag 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,096,622 697,643 3,735,234 
R. Ley 5 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1,996,023 0 0 0 0 0 
Hansa-Uoyd 5 8 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 2,160,179 0 0 0 
"Hansa" - 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 2,465,635 0 378,776 
Horch 15 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,925,000 
Adler 17 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,006,114 0 0 
Magrrus 12 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,945 1,241,664 889,132 1,179,036 
Be= 0 0 0 - - - - - 0 0 
Daimler-B. 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,477,496 
Gothaer-W l2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,428,031 891,703 9,082,984 0 0 
Cyklon - 0 10 - - - - - 0 
BMW - 10 10 12 14 14 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vomag 30 0 0 0 4 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 201,566 
Elite-Diamont 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 493,116 0 442,002 4,911,601 0 
Wanderer 24 l2 12 l2 l2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,631,034 0 
D~g 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 660,800 0 1,252 57,384 1,478,505 2,963,992 
Stoewer - 10 0 0 0 6 0 0 2,077,735 0 0 0 0 634,382 
DKW - 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,731,897 
Audi - 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,895,913 2,505,912 0 136,917 65,629 594,209 
Phonomen - 0 10 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Herkules 4 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
,t 0 16,817,556 12,052,873 1,124,834 24,157,709 24,192,183 27,271,953 
F. Lederman, a. a. 0., S. 31. 
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and then down to 3 in 1928/29, while all the rest simply omitted all dividends. BMW, Wanderer 
and Vomag were the rare exceptions, but their profit came from other sources; in the case of 
BMW, motorcycle and aircraft engine, typewriters and business-use calculator for Wandere, and 
in the case of Vomag, tricotting and roll printing machinery department contributed to their 
superior performance.24) In all of these companies, automobile division operated in deficit. 
Table 4b shows net losses which appeared in the balance sheets of these same companies. 
We see that before the First World War, none of them recorded any loss, but during the period 
period of "industrial rationalization movement", all except BMW turned out large amount of 
accumulated losses. As of 1929, total of accumulated losses of these 27 companies amounted to 
93, 102, 322 RM, which was roughly one-half of their total equity capital of approximately 200, 
000,000 RM. zS) Clearly, in spite of the remarkable growth of production output, the German 
automobile industry at that time was far from successful from a financial point of view. as 
almost all suffered from serious losses. 
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Fig. 4 Index of stock price of German automobil firms 1. 1925-12. 1930 Frankfurter Zeitung. 
24) F. 1edennann, a. a. 0., S. 31. 
25) F. Ledermann, a. a. 0., S. 34. 
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of stock price of the German automobile manufacturers in this period. It shows beyond any 
doubt the dichromatic conditions of these companies. From 1926 to 1927, the "rationalization" 
movement was popular enough to cause the share prices to skyrocket by 145 points from 55 to 
200. However, a crash starts in mid-1927. From the peak of 200 in May, 1927, the stock price 
tumbles 81 points to 119 in December, and following a period of temporary stabilization, it again 
starts to fall rapidly. From 132 in August, 1928 to 41 in October, 1929, the stock price lost 159 
points. In fact, the German automobile industry had long been in the deep recession26) prior to 
the crash of New York Stock Exchange (the black Thursday) on October 24, 1929 which 
triggered the worldwide panic. Why then was the industry in such a bad status? 
2. Direct Reasons 
Looking into the reasons why automobile manufacturers of Germany were turning out poor 
performance, we soon find a significant fact. As we have already seen, 1928 was the year in 
which these companies managed to increase output by leaps and bounds thanks to the production 
innovation under the rationalization movement. Automobile output reached the peak.. Table 5 
concerns this peak year, and shows plant capacity utilization rate for those major manufacturers 
by comparing actual number of car output and annual production capacity of each company. 
Understandably, there are considerable differences among them and it is not easy to generalize, 
but on the whole, we notice that the capacity utilization was quite low. We might ignore the 
case of Daimler-Benz because it produced only high-class cars, but even the highest of them, 
BMW and Opel, shows the ratio of no more than 60%, while the averge of the largest seven 
companies representing 75% of total German car output is a mere 35.4%. This is a sharp 
contrast to the performance of U. S. car manufacturers in the same year. also included in the 
table (lower columns). Uhe U. S. automobile makers realized the average utilizazion ratio of 
82.0%. while Ford. the best of them, attained almost 90% in plant utilization.21) This shocklingly 
low utilization of plant capacity obviously caused drastic impacts on management of the 
automobile manufacturers in Germany. 
It goes without saying that "production rationalization" in the Gennan automobile industry 
was achieved by huge investment in fixed assets. Because of the special character of the process 
of values transferred from fixed capital to output, of which we are all aware, magnitude of that 
part of value of fixed capital transferred to individual unit of output varies to a large extent 
depending on utilization of plant which represents the most of the fixed invested capital. 
Fluctuation of plant capacity utilization ratio is thus reflected in cost of output. The larger the 
amount of fixed capital, the cost variance is greater. 
26) Furukawa, in his "Shiteki Zentei" (ibid.) says that the management crisis of German automobile 
companies became "apparent" under the Worldwide recession, but it is not correct. 
27) The data are from F. Ledermann, a. a. 0., 104. based on the Berliner Tagblatt of May 30, 1928. It 
should be remembered that from 1927 to 1928, Ford was in the process of shifting from Model T to 
Model A, and for this reason, more research is needed for reconciliation of the data and time fac-
tors. 
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Tab. 5 Plant capacity utilization rate of German Automobil firms 1928 
Firm Plant capacity Plant capacity Actual output Utilization rate 
of a day of year 
Opel 250 75,000 45,543 67.7(%) 
Brennabor 250 75,000 6,781 9.0 
Adler 24,000 7,233 30.1 
BMW 15,000 9,000 60.0 
Daimler-Benz 16,000 2) 11,656 70.3 
Auto Union 30,000 2) 8,655 28.8 
Hanomag 26,000 3,400 13.0 
Those 7 Firms 261,000 92,268 35.4 
German Automobil industry's 122,661 Total 
Plant capacity utilization rate of U. S. automobil firms 1928 
Finn Plant capacity Actual output 1928 Utilization rate of a year 
OM 3,375,000 2,700,000 80.0(%) 
Ford 2,650,000 2,370,000 89.3 
Chrysler-Dodge 932,000 746,000 80.0 
Those 3 Firms 5,816,000 
U. S. automobil industry'S Total 9,393,000 7,764,000 82.0 
1) Ledermann, a. a. 0., S. 120. 
2) H. Maurer, a. a. 0., S. 3. 
3) Aggregate of production of Wanderer, DKW, Horch, & Audi. 
4) Ledermann, a. a. 0., S. 104. Ford includes Ford Canada. 
As an example, we will see the case of painting cost at Adler-Werke shown in Table 6. This 
company replaced manual painting with a new process called high temperature immersion 
process (Tauchlakierverfahren) incorporated in the streamlined production system. Labor cost, 
consumption of immersion lipuid and paint vary roughly in accordance with operating ratio. On 
the other hand, depreciation (value transferred from fixed capital to product) and interest are 
fixed costs, and for this reason, painting cost per automobile varies depending on the number of 
automobiles to which the fixed cost is allocated. At the utilization rate of 33-1/3%, the 
allocation covers 5,000 cars, and painting cost per car amounts to 34.46 RM. When utilization 
rate is doubted, there are 10. 000 cars to ahsorb the fixed cost, and painting cost per unit drops 
to 19.64 RM. If full capacity utilization is achieved by producing 15,000 cars, painting cost per 
unit further decreases to t4. 70 RM. If, in this instance, the market determines painting price 
per unit to be 29.00 RM on the average, then Adler-Werke must incur a loss of 15.46 RM per 
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Tab. 6 Paiting cost at Adler Werke (RM) 
Capacity utilization rate 33Ys% 66Ys% lUO 
Output a~ year 5,000 10,000 15,000 
Fixed cost depreciation and interest 104,880 104,880 104,880 
Labor cost 12,960 15,120 17,280 
Consumption of immersion liquid 6UO 1,050 1,5UO 
Consumption of paint 15,000 30,000 45,000 
etc. 38,800 45,360 51,840 
Total 172,370 196,410 220,500 
Unit painting cost 34.46 19.64 14.70 
H. Ludwing, Die Arbeitslosigkeit in dec deutschen Automobdindustrie, Schriften des Vcreins for 
Sozialpolitik, 185/lI, 1932, S. 143. 
unit at the capacity utilization rate of 33-1/3% and "annual loss ratio" to total sales of 45%. If 
utilization is improved to 66-2/3%. it turns out the profit of 0.64 RM per unit or total 6400 
RM, which makes annual return on sales of 3.3%. At 100% capacity utilization ratio, the profit 
per unit goes up to 4.30 RM, turning out total profit of 64,500 RM or annual return on sales of 
29.3%. In this case, the "break-even point" is achieved at the utilization ratio of approximately 
66% from industrial accounting point of view. 
If we extrapolate this example to assume that the same applies more or less to the whole 
automobile industry of Germany at that time, significance of the extremely low capacity 
utilization of 35.49% on the average becomes all clear. The outstanding production capacity 
achieved by massive investment in fixed capital during the "rationalization movement" period 
could only be justified as a means of cost saving resulting from "mass production" 28)--otherwise it 
is no more than a "far too expensive" investment. 
To see the state of art stream lined production system introduced as a means of 
"rationalization" consuming raw materials and turning out expensive products which are only to 
become inventory29) must have been one of the most irrational sights under the prevailing 
industrial rationlization movement in Germany. On one hand, the low level of capacity 
utilization pushed up cost of German cars, while on the other hand import of cheap U . .s. cars 
28) The concept of "mass production" is obviously a relative one and it is not easy to define it. In this 
paper, we use it in the sense of an "intrinsic mechanical system" or "autonomous machine system" 
as distinct from the use of "individual machines which are independent one from the other" (K. 
Marx, the Capital", Vol. 1, Hoyaku Zenshu Ia pp.495-497) when such system is continuously 
operated. 
29) F. Ledennann, a. a. 0., S. 38. 
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continued to increase from 12,000 in 1927 to 18,000 in 1928. Furthermore, the number of 
automobiles assembled by non-Gennan companies established in Germany (U. S. firms mainly) 
went up from 22,000 in 1927 to 35,000 in 1928.30) This dual hardship in competition further 
depressed market price of automobiles in Germany-from 100 in 1925 to 80 in June, 1926, to 70 a 
year later, and down to 65 in June, 1928.31) The Gennan automobile manufacturers were caught 
between the declining price of their products and higher costs to produce them. This was the 
direct cause of crisis of the industry. 
3. Consequences of the Crisis 
Table 7a indicates transition of the number of Gennan automobile manufacturers from 1924 
(at the start of the rationalization movement) to 1932. The process of rationalization in 
German automobile industry was at the same time that of elimination of smaller and weaker 
manufacturers who were unable to invest for rationalization. In fact, the number of manufactur-
ers decreased consistently from 86 in 1924 to 49 in 1925 and to 30 in 1926, but it is of special 
interest that the elimination process continued even after innovation of production system: the 
number goes down from 30 in 1926 to 19 in 1927, and then to 17 in 1929. It is clear that in this 
Tab.7 a Number of German automobil firms 1924-32 
Year 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
Firm 86 49 30 19 27 17 16 19 17 
A. Becker, Absatzprobleme der deutschen PKW-induslrie, 1979, S. 56. 
b Mergers in German automobil industry 1926--1932 
Yea' Old Firm New Firm 
1926 6. Daimler Motoren Werke, Benz & Cie, AG Daimler-Benz AG 
12. Gotha Wagon, Cycron Gotha Wagon 
1927 Presto, NAG NAG 
1928 Bussing, Mulak Bussing 
1929 BMW, Gotha Wagon, Cycron, Dixi BMW 
1929 Hansa-ILoyd, Hansa Hansa-Loyd 
1929 OM, Adam Opel Adam Opel Subzideary 
1930 Bussing, NAG Bussing-NAG 
1932 Audi, Horch, Wanderer, DKW Auto Union 
Seherr-Thoss, Q. Q. D., S. 644-645. 
30) Seherr-Jhoss, a. a. 0., S. 216, 221. 
31) F. Ledermann, a. a. 0., S. 15. 
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process, a massive concentration of capital -by mergers and acquisitions- took place in the 
industry as the result of the crisis. 
Table 7b shows important mergers between German automobile manufacturers since 1926. 
This has achieved the introduction of division of labor among those companies, having realized 
plant innovation, in order to decrease variety of competing classes of cars and to increase the 
scale of production and use of common parts and components. 32) 
Major banks in Germany3]) (Deutsche Bank, Diskonto Gesselschaft, Dresner Bank, Danato 
Bank, etc.) were behind the scene, pushing hard to promote the merger process. It is a well-
known fact that during the "industrial rationalization movement", foreign capital--especially V. S. 
banks-supplied a significant part of both short and long-tenn loans needed for rationalization. 
Financing of long-tenn capital by means of bond issue at overseas markee4) was only possible 
for steel industry, manufacturer of electrical equipment and other big business, far from the 
reach of Gennan automobile industry still in the infancy. Because of this constraint, supply of 
capital needed for rationalization of Gennan automobile companies had to come from large 
banks in Gennany. A part of this was supplied from foreign country-V. S. A. for instance in the 
fonn of short-tenn loans to the Gennan banks who redistributed them to manufacturers 
concerned. It is not surprising that there developed very strong relationships between the banks 
and automobile companies, and due to the crisis on the part of the borrowers, their growing 
Habilities allowed the banks to exert more and more influence35) on management of the 
companies. As the result of this process, the banks and major automobile manufacturers 
developed affiliations as shown in Table 8. 36) These large banks were in turn of course instru-








Sachsische Staatsbane --- Auto Union 
33) For equity assets, balance of deposit etc. of major Gennan banks in the period, see K. Gossweiler, 
Grossbanken Industriemonople Sfaat. Oknomie und Politik des sfaatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus 
in Deufschland 1914-19321Japanbse translation by Kawanabe, Kumagaya. and Matsumoto, 
"Daiginko • Kogyodokusen • Kokka-Weimar-ki Doitsu Kokka Dokusen Shihonshugi Ron, p. 422. 
34) Tsukamoto, ibid. pp. 60-61 and Table 25. 
35) Example 1. In the case of Horch, Saxony National Bank took 2.5 million RM of the total amount 
(3 million RM) of capital increase. Example 2. Daimler-Benz conveoted its bank liabilities (4 
million RM) into stock and bonds, most of which were acquired by Deutsche Bank. Example 3. 
For Adler-Werke, the loan syndicate headed by Danato Hank subscribed for 15 million RM worth 
of new shares, and the proceeds were used by Adler to reduce borrowings. A. Becker, a. a. 0., S. 
66. 
36) A. Becker, a. a. 0., S. 68. 
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mental to progress of concentration of capital in the German automobile industry. Deutsche 
Bank, who now controlled Daimler-Benz and BMW, went as far as to create "German Auto R 
mobile Trust" by combining "3 number of money-losing automobile makers" with a view to 
compete with U. S. car industry who was far superior in scale.37) In line with this strategy, 
Deutsche Bank in 1929 proposed to Danato Bank merger of Opel and Daimler-Benz. Opel was 
the biggest German producer of lower class cars while Daimler-Benz was the unchallenged 
leader of high-class vehicles at that time. In 1928, their combined output represented more than 
40 percent of total car production in Germany. Success of the merger would have resulted in 
formation of the nucleus of automobile industry of Germany. Surprisingly, however, Danato 
offered Opel to General Motors. 38) 
What was hidden behind the event was the desire of American financial capital (especially 
Morgan capital) to seek various ways and means to control major industry of Germany, 
including but not limited to supply of funds needed by the industrial rationalization movement 
following the "Doze Plan" of 1924. In that sense, Danato Bank as well as Dresner Bank were a 
sort of agent for the U. S. capital. 39) In any event, the crisis of German automobile companies 
developed into a "struggle between the financial capital of Germany and that of the United 
States over the control of automobile industry of Germany". 
We have already seen that the industry was under the constraint of marginal growth of 
demand for automobiles. In fact, it prevented successful development of mass production system 
and this was the basic reason that led the industry into the crisis and the apparent failure to stay 
in competition for survival in the face of the United States. We must clarify why the demand 
marginality was so narrow, and what was the course of prospects for resolution of the crisis. 
37) K. Gossweiler, a. a. 0., Japanese translation, ibid., p. 407. The promotor was G. von Stauss, who 
later became President of the Board of the Auditors. "he was born in Wiirtenburg, after a period of 
training at the Royal Wiirtenburg Bank, he entered Deutsche bank in 1898 to work as private 
secretary under the Bank's owner, Georg von Siemens, and after his death (1901), under Arthur 
von Gwinner who was the successer to von Siemens and a leading figure in the struggle with 
Rockfeller-Standard Petroleum. In 1906, Stauss was made responsible for petroleumrelated activi-
ties of Deutsche Bank and as such, he was one of the most important people supporting expansion of 
German imperialism in the Balkan countries and Middle East. He went to the United States in 1913 
and set up an agreement with the Rockfeller Trust. From 1915, he was a Director of Deutsche 
Bank, and until the postwar period, he oversaw specialty electrical machnery, chemicals, automobile, 
alrcraft, movies and light industry sectors, which were concentrated in the South, i. e. in Bavaria 
and Wiirtenberg", (ibid., p. 34, the author's underline). 
38) Ibid., p. 407. 
39) Ibid., pp. 329, 370. Gossweiler called them "the American Group which the "Dawes" trend created 
within the monopolistic bourgeoisy in Germany", ibid., p. 329. 
